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Review Article
The Socialist Design
Urban Dilemmas in Postwar Europe and the Soviet 
Union
ELIDOR MËHILLI
We programmed a system and it programmed us.1
—György Konrád, !e City Builder
“We managed to rearrange the city down to the last grain of sand,” declares 
György Konrád’s frantic, impassionate, obsessive, idealistic city builder.2 
He has gone through all the trials of communist rule: a distinctly bourgeois 
background, enchantment, postwar professional success, ambitious building 
assignments, arrest, imprisonment, disenchantment, and, !nally, release 
from prison into a world without Stalin but still with total planning. His 
unnamed socialist city, like Konrád’s text, is dense, polluted, sprawling, and 
layered. "e scale of urban planning appears both awesome and terrifying, 
provoking in the builder disgust just as much as pride. One minute he is 
mighty, with his bird’s eye view and 600 convicts working under him; the 
next he is languishing in a Stalinist prison designed by his own father. His 
bold plans for remaking the fabric of society seem to radically depart from 
anything ever done before, yet they merely introduce “a modi!ed system of 
inequalities in place of older systems.”3 Both the provincial East European 
city and its builder seem inextricably tied to the same fate. Indeed, at the 
For inspiration, guidance, and criticisms, I am grateful to Stephen Kotkin. "e article has 
greatly bene!ted from the thoughtful suggestions of Jan Plamper, who closely read numerous 
versions, and the editors of the journal. "e research was made possible by generous support 
from the Department of History at Princeton University and a Mellon predoctoral fellowship 
at "e George Washington University.
 1 George [György] Konrád, !e City Builder (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 
82.  
 2 Ibid., 27.
 3 Ibid., 96.
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root of his delirious wanderings is the awareness that he—like any of his 
drawings—is also a product of planning. "is paradox of feeling power and 
powerlessness, ambition mixed with resignation, pride with pessimism, while 
being in control of everything yet seemingly ruled by the terms of others, 
pervades the mind of the city builder, just as it does the system around him.
Taking a cue from two rigorous and insightful books—Stephen Bittner’s 
account of the “many lives” of the Soviet "aw and Greg Castillo’s study of 
the Cold War as a series of battles in design and the domestic sphere—as 
well as a recent explosion of interest among historians in the Khrushchev 
era, “spatial history,” material culture, and East–West exchanges, this article 
addresses the paradoxes of the "aw as exempli!ed in urban form.4 It argues 
for the interconnected nature of domestic, international, and Eastern bloc-
level dynamics by viewing processes of the "aw simultaneously from the 
angles of neighborhood, city, and empire.5 "ese angles capture the evolving 
relationship with the Soviet past, the expansion of the Cold War into 
everyday city life, and the burgeoning exchange in knowledge, technology, 
and planning instruments among socialist countries. More suggestive than 
prescriptive, the choice of these three levels of analysis does not imply that the 
concomitant processes were discrete from one another.6 Indeed, a number of 
threads run throughout the essay: local battles over the meaning of socialist 
material culture, with their unexpected turns and twists; the participation 
of socialist planning in an international arena; but also, equally important, 
the earnest e#ort to devise a common planning model and architectural 
vocabulary across socialist space. "e resulting “socialist design” was an 
amalgam produced by formal and informal exchange, an institutionalized 
logic of planning, invention, and imported technology, but also a self-
induced competition with the capitalist West. Bittner’s work, reviewed in 
the !rst section of this article, elucidates the domestic dilemmas of the Soviet 
 4 See Stephen V. Bittner, !e Many Lives of Khrushchev’s !aw: Experience and Memory in 
Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); and Greg Castillo, Cold War on 
the Home Front: !e Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010).
 5 On the broader interpretive implications of transnational approaches for Soviet history, see 
Michael David-Fox, “"e Implications of Transnationalism,” Kritika 12, 4 (2011): 885–904. 
For a valuable example, see Austin Jersild, “"e Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: ‘Catch Up 
and Surpass’ in the Transnational Socialist Bloc, 1950–1960,” American Historical Review 116, 
1 (2011): 109–32.
 6 “"e city–region–nation framework,” argues Gyan Prakash, “does violence to the history 
of modern cities,” and he accordingly advocates for increased attention to global engagements 
but also “ ‘thick’ local imaginaries.” See his “Introduction,” in !e Spaces of the Modern City: 
Imaginaries, Politics, and Everyday Life, ed. Prakash and Kevin Kruse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 9.
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"aw. Castillo’s analysis, taken up in the middle section, sheds light on the 
transnational entanglements of a Cold War battle over consumption and 
design supremacy. My third section examines an architectural episode in 
Moscow in 1958 to argue for both the relevance and the speci!city of the 
“Eastern bloc arena” in these international postwar currents.
 "e context is Khrushchev’s "aw, the decade or so after Stalin’s death, 
which has produced everything from detailed studies on Khrushchev’s 
personality to analyses of the post-Stalin succession struggle, the release of Gulag 
prisoners, the tumultuous year 1956, and on to studies of de-Stalinization, 
state designs, and domesticity.7 From the onset, the "aw became associated 
with the cultural realm. Yet in contrast to foreign policy, culture, in Nancy 
Condee’s words, “could tolerate no peaceful coexistence.”8 She concludes that 
the "aw was “not about the lessening of con$ict” but rather “about the 
rhetoric of con$ict: its rules, tropes, and gestures.”9 One might add that the 
"aw was also about the realization—on the part of individuals like Konrád’s 
city builder—of living in a system that had programmed its own planners. 
Beyond these domestic developments, the "aw was also about an intense 
systemic competition. "e postwar years introduced a series of new challenges, 
including reconstruction, decolonization, and the “friendship of the peoples,” 
all of which tested interwar de!nitions of internationalism. When coupled 
with the postwar boom of capitalist economies, the acquired Soviet sphere 
of in$uence in Europe could also turn into a liability, since socialist states 
explicitly presented themselves as superior to their Western counterparts. 
 7 Accounts of the Soviet "aw include C. L. Sulzberger, !e Big !aw (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1956); Giuseppe Bo#a, Inside the Khrushchev Era (New York: Marzani and 
Munsell, 1959); Liudmila Alexeyeva, !e !aw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin 
Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: 
Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 151–204; William 
Taubman, Khrushchev: !e Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); and Polly Jones, 
ed., !e Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev 
Era (London: Routledge, 2006). On the succession struggle, see, among others, Mark Kramer, 
“"e Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal–
External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, 1 (1999): 
3–55. On Gulag returnees, see Amir Weiner, “"e Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East 
European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” Journal of Modern History 78, 2 (2006): 
333–76; and Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the 
Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). On postwar material 
culture in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern bloc, see Susan E. Reid and David Crowley, 
eds., Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe (Oxford: 
Berg, 2000). 
 8 Nancy Condee, “Cultural Codes of the "aw,” in Nikita Khrushchev, ed. William Taubman, 
Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 160–76, 
quotation on 164.
 9 Ibid., 169.
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Just as maturing awareness of the Soviet (or Stalinist) past under Khrushchev 
could seem to reinvigorate the system, therefore, so anxious attempts to 
catch and overtake the West could seem to depress it. "is constitutes part 
of the story. But beyond Soviet–West exchanges, it is important not to ignore 
the Eastern bloc level of analysis. Stalin’s death was followed by e#orts to 
revive the socialist integration project, resulting in more sustained exchange, 
planning coordination, and often more con$ict among socialist countries 
themselves. As arenas where transnational actors, state authorities, planners, 
and users all converged, material culture and the built environment are 
particularly suitable for examining these overlapping dilemmas of the "aw. 
Neighborhood
Stephen Bittner analyzes the "aw not at the level of society at large but 
through the daily lived experience in a single neighborhood, Moscow’s 
Arbat, and through the lens of various cultural actors: musicians and 
trainees; theater directors and guardians of repertoire; architects, planners, 
and preservation experts. "is allows the author to weave characters and 
stories into a readable narrative. But the focus on agents of culture has more 
wide-ranging implications. "e lives of these individuals permit Bittner to 
capture the contradictions contained in the metaphor of ottepel´, "aw. 
Bittner asserts that in a world gushing with other strong metaphors, the 
"aw was a $awed one. He calls attention not to a period of springtime after 
Stalinism, but to “impermanence, instability, and uncertainty” (3). Within 
the cultural realm, seemingly trivial clashes in interpretation quickly escalated 
into real-life drama. Bittner’s achievement is to capture these individual and 
professional lives riddled with ambition and contradiction but also with 
increasing awareness of their own past. Implicitly, the choice of focusing on 
agents of culture also recognizes that no matter how vast expectations of de-
Stalinization may have been in other areas, the "aw was chie$y a matter of 
the cultural sphere. For these intellectual types “"aw” was real, even though 
it also remained permanently tied to !ction (via Ilya Ehrenburg).
Bittner’s Arbat, then, is almost exclusively inhabited by intellectuals and 
their ghosts. Having become synonymous with childhood in the works of 
authors like Bulat Okudzhava and Anatolii Rybakov, the Arbat seemed to 
preserve the aura of an old, pre-concrete Moscow. In fact, the neighborhood 
underwent routine demolitions and recon!gurations, as airy apartments once 
owned by aristocrats turned into densely populated communal apartments. 
"e neighborhood became, as Bittner puts it, “a casualty of Soviet power” 
(36). For many who lived in the Arbat, Stalinism was disruptive, destructive, 
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invalidating. But as urban destruction and spatial recon!gurations created 
new spaces and realities, so the Stalin era produced new relations and modes 
of thinking (along with institutions and nodes of interest). De-Stalinization, 
which Bittner describes as “neither systemic in scope, nor coherent in 
implementation,” often dramatically revealed the creative (if sinister) 
dimensions of Stalinism. Indeed, had Stalinism not entailed a way of being 
in the world, seemingly minor challenges would hardly have escalated into 
loud public storms in the 1950s. Although he does not explicitly state this, 
Bittner’s work suggests that it makes more sense to study processes of the 
"aw as signs of maturing Soviet awareness and identi!cation with the past, 
punctuated by attendant anxieties vis-à-vis the Western lifestyle, rather than 
more examples of alleged resistance or challenges to “the state” or the “Soviet 
system.”
Take, for instance, Arbat’s Gnesin Music-Pedagogy Institute, where 
teachers observed an alarming rise of student interest in Western composers 
(George Gershwin, Igor Stravinsky, Paul Hindemith). While the teachers 
favored more “openness” in repertoire, they nevertheless enforced norms that 
limited exposure to Western composers. Why was this the case? In part, as 
Bittner shows, this was a result of the incoherence and contradictory nature 
of the "aw, which denounced Stalin but did not actually replace Stalin’s 
cultural decrees. Some teachers associated threats to the curriculum with 
disciplinary problems among students. "e most rebellious youths, in turn, 
interpreted stringent academic controls as Stalinist. But although the "aw 
brought to surface these generational con$icts, it did not fundamentally alter 
the essential mechanisms of power. It merely laid some of them bare, which 
is to say that it exposed virtually everyone as actively involved in battling 
over the borders of socialist culture. Bittner captures precisely this tension 
between the awareness of a distinct Soviet cultural mission (embodied in the 
school curriculum) and a pervasive anxiety about Western culture. Teachers 
at the Gnesin, he notes, “did not have to be Stalinists to be saddened by 
some aspects of the thaw” (74). Like the neighborhood, which became a 
metaphor for the collective memory of many of its illustrious and often ill-
fated inhabitants, the school curriculum was about something more than 
pedagogy. It was part of the civilizational mission of Stalinism, and one did 
not have to be a Stalinist, even after Khrushchev’s assault in February 1956, 
to be devoted to it. 
"e "aw itself, Bittner argues in the second half of the book, later 
became an object of nostalgia. Suddenly, an era of openness by decree, marked 
by a man who was held in esteem neither by the populace nor by creative 
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types—“a meddler par excellence”—became remembered as having o#ered a 
missed opportunity (6). "e idea of the "aw as a “liberal period” emerged 
in contrast to a post-"aw era of stagnation and renewed restrictions. Bittner 
rejects this linear trajectory along an axis of progress and regress. "e break 
between the Stalin and Khrushchev years, he argues, was far from coherent 
or abrupt. Still, in light of Bittner’s analysis, a number of other questions 
emerge: Could it be, perhaps, that sudden !ts of openness actually reinforced 
party rule? Could it be that destabilization in the cultural sphere proved 
productive insofar as it enabled power struggles among apparatchiks, o%cials, 
and other elites? "ese struggles bene!ted the communist establishment, 
which discovered that it was not necessary to enforce strict cultural continuity 
to ensure party continuity. 
So what exactly changed during the "aw? Factories were renamed, 
statues were dismantled, and the Lenin cult quietly replaced the Stalin cult.10 
To assess the signi!cance of the "aw, Bittner fast-forwards to the 1960s, 
when the Arbat hosted the infamous trial of the writers Andrei Siniavskii and 
Iulii Daniel´ at the Institute of World Literature. "is trial constituted, he 
argues, the very public beginning of a retraction of the autonomy “on loan” 
to the cultural elite in the 1960s (178). Bittner insists that in the course of a 
decade enough had changed among the intelligentsia to foster a more resilient 
challenge to arbitrary political controls. By the mid-1960s, however, the 
debate had essentially shrunk to the issue of leaving the autonomy of cultural 
institutions in place or taking it back altogether. As further evidence of the 
intelligentsia’s opposition to the establishment, Bittner points to numerous 
letters written in support of Siniavskii and Daniel´, some of which employed 
a new dichotomy between “"aw” and “freeze.” But as Bittner admits, 
not everyone wrote in support of the authors on trial; some apparently 
admonished them. Bittner argues that the letters written in support of the 
two authors re$ected the emergence of a new “civic duty.” It would have 
made sense, however, also to analyze the letters that were critical of Siniavskii 
and Daniel´, if only as a re$ection, perhaps, of a di#erent kind of duty. Still, 
one does not have to share Bittner’s assessment of the overall importance of 
these letter-writing campaigns or the distinction between a “civic duty” and 
alternative kinds of duties (ideological, professional, communist, Soviet) to 
appreciate the argument for a collective engagement with the narrative of the 
"aw. 
10 For a compelling overview of the urban e#ects of de-Stalinization on Moscow, see Timothy 
J. Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1995), 
358–81.
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"at engagement took many forms. Like October, the "aw was also 
eventually told, whether in writing or speech.11 "ese narratives employed a 
distinct chronology (as evidenced by the urban reshaping of the Arbat) but 
they also inevitably referred to an o%cial Soviet chronology. Bittner traces 
this engagement in two other examples drawn from the architectural and 
planning professions. First, he argues that emerging activists increasingly 
pushed state actors to preserve historic urban sites. Within the complicated 
framework of the Soviet Union, these kinds of pressures could give rise 
to multiple con$icts both at the level of a republic and at the level of the 
union. In Bittner’s account, Moscow-based preservationists, architects, and 
planners (but also the construction industry itself ) increasingly waged a 
battle in the mid-1960s over what elements of the built environment were 
worthy of preservation. As other scholars have pointed out, con$icts between 
preservationists and state bureaucrats were signs of maturing professional 
awareness but also intense competition for resources.12 But these battles also 
crucially revealed the tension and mutually constitutive dimensions of Soviet 
and local identities, since experts often employed local examples to make the 
case for a Soviet heritage.
"e other example is what Bittner calls “the rehabilitation of the avant-
garde.” Debates among experts and bureaucrats about industrial building 
methods and preservation took place in a climate of growing interest in the 
Constructivist architecture of the 1920s and its role in the history of the Soviet 
Union more broadly. Planners could now speak openly about this $ourishing 
architectural period and the visionary names associated with it: Konstantin 
Mel´nikov, Ivan Leonidov, Moisei Ginzburg, and others. In the context of the 
"aw, the avant-garde took on a new meaning, revealing not only awareness 
of the Soviet past but also its cultural standing vis-à-vis the capitalist West. 
Still, this was no full-$edged return to Constructivism. Brilliant as it is in 
conjuring up a particular political process under party-state rule, the term 
“rehabilitation” should not be taken literally. Fundamentally, the avant-
garde was never o%cially recon!rmed as a viable model. Exhumed, yes, but 
not fully rehabilitated. Indeed, it is a legacy that remains threatened to this 
day. "e association between Constructivism and later Soviet architecture 
remained tenuous, the return incomplete. Khrushchev, after all, as Condee 
11 See Frederick Corney, Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
12 See John P. Farrell, “If "ese Stones Could Only Speak: Historical and Cultural Preservation 
in a Soviet Context, 1955–1966” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 2004).
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Death of a Modernist Icon: Moisei Ginzburg (with I. Milinis), 
Narkom!n Communal House, 1928–30, Moscow, southern view 
Source: Author’s photograph, 2009.
A Modernist Icon under Restoration: Konstantin Mel´nikov,  
Rusakov Workers Club, 1927–28, Moscow, street view 
Source: Author’s photograph, 2009.
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has remarked, was a “cultural critic” who harbored a noticeable “antipathy 
towards modernism.”13 
Both examples are revealing precisely because of the tension between 
ideology and the long-standing ambitions of socialist planners, on the one 
hand, and collective identi!cation with the Soviet past and an increasing 
push by Soviet authorities toward competition with the capitalist world, on 
the other. "ey also demonstrate that the Soviet built environment presents 
us with a somewhat special case in the social and cultural spheres, insofar as 
authorities allowed the (partial) resurrection of certain pre-Stalinist forms.14 
Constructivism became a vehicle to identify a valuable Soviet legacy in 
architecture. It also seemed to satisfy two criteria of the "aw: a rejection 
of Stalinism, as an evil personi!ed in one !gure, and an embrace of Soviet 
ambitions vis-à-vis the West (where specialists increasingly recognized the 
in$uence of Soviet Constructivism).15 It may be tempting to read preservation 
e#orts as a form of challenge toward the Soviet state. Yet, as many valuable 
accounts of urban preservation in Western Europe and the United States 
have established, preservation actors are guided by speci!c interests, beliefs, 
and a distinct logic about history and the past.16 Rather than strictly a !eld 
of opposition or even resistance to the establishment, preservation could 
be e#ectively co-opted by the party-state.17 In addition to such topics as 
tourism and consumer culture in the Eastern bloc, this is a promising avenue 
of research that can potentially tell us a great deal not merely about the 
dilemmas of de-Stalinization and the life cycles of reform but also, crucially, 
about the production of a history of socialism itself, the developing awareness 
of a recent socialist past, and the ways in which that awareness was connected 
to material life.18 
13 Condee, “Cultural Codes of the "aw,” 171.
14 On this point, see Michael David-Fox, “Cultural Memory in the Century of Upheaval: Big 
Pictures and Snapshots,” Kritika 2, 3 (2001): 601–13.
15 Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Architettura contemporanea (Milan: Electa, 
1976). See also Patrizia Bonifazio et al., “Introduzione,” in Tra guerra e pace: Società, cultura 
e architettura nel secondo dopoguerra, ed. Bonifazio et al. (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1998), 9–33.
16 M. Christine Boyer, !e City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural 
Entertainments (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Boyer argues that Western urban design 
and preservation e#orts in the 1970s and 1980s often borrowed from 19th-century fabrications 
to nostalgically “recreate” the past from fragmented urban remnants. 
17 In socialist Albania, for example, Soviet-trained architect Gani Strazimiri helped launch 
a pioneering campaign to preserve “museum cities” in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, state 
authorities intentionally left religious architecture to deteriorate.
18 See Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, eds., Turizm: !e Russian and East European 
Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). For 
examples beyond the Eastern bloc, see D. Medina Lasansky and Brian McLaren, eds., 
Architecture and Tourism: Perception, Performance, and Place (Oxford: Berg, 2004).
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City
Tensions produced by the "aw were made evident at Novyi Arbat, the 
ambitious Khrushchev-era urban planning project that transformed the old 
neighborhood into a modern showpiece. You go for a stroll along the busy 
thoroughfare, past Moskovskii dom knigi, amid the cacophony of stores 
blasting pop music, the sandwiched snack bars, and the cafés nestled within 
the winding gallery on the southern side, and you can’t help but !nd the 
sheer scale of this urban ensemble daunting—even in a city like Moscow. To 
make room for the nine mammoth glass and concrete skyscrapers erected in 
the 1960s, entire buildings in the neighborhood had to be razed, alleyways 
blotted out, throngs of inhabitants relocated. Ultimately, four towers rose 
on a two-story gallery running the whole corridor while !ve other structures 
were set freestanding on the northern side. What started out as a relatively 
simple street project in the late 1950s ballooned into a sprawling enterprise 
within a matter of years. Novyi Arbat became something of a symbol of an 
era, a clear departure from the architectural and planning models of the Stalin 
period. But it also came to embody a modernizing ethos heightened by the 
postwar West European boom.19
In December 1954, Khrushchev, whom Bittner calls “a kind of architect 
manqué” (109), famously railed against Stalin-era architecture at the All-Union 
Convention of Construction Workers.20 "ough hardly secret, the speech had 
for architects and planners the kind of seismic impact that the February 1956 
speech at the 20th Party Congress would have for communists across the world. 
Khrushchev criticized Moscow’s ornate skyscrapers and took the construction 
industry to task for having long invoked the tenets of Socialist Realism to 
justify extravagant designs and !nancial folly. Alternating between sarcasm 
and reprimand, he warned against super$uities in construction (but also a 
reversion to Constructivism) while urging simplicity in design and a rapid 
expansion of industrial building methods.21 "ere was plenty of irony in the 
fact that the supposed turn from aesthetic authoritarianism came in the form, 
19 Amir Weiner has argued that the renunciation of terror under Khrushchev came with a 
“renewed investment of power and trust in the population” but also a lingering “utopian drive” 
from the Stalin era. See his “Robust Revolution to Retiring Revolution: "e Life Cycle of the 
Soviet Revolution, 1945–1968,” Slavonic and East European Review 86, 2 (2008): 208–31.
20 Khrushchev’s speech was excerpted in an early pioneering volume on international 
postwar architecture. See “Remove Shortcomings in Design, Improve Work of Architects,” 
in Architecture Culture, 1943–1968, ed. Joan Ockman (New York: Rizzoli, 1993), 184–89.
21 "ere was more than a hint of political calculation to Khrushchev’s intervention, especially 
as the attack came during the !nal stages of the post-Stalin succession struggle. See Vladislav 
Zubok, A Failed Empire: !e Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 94–101.
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essentially, of a scathingly delivered order. With the ornate gigantomania of 
the Stalin era angrily dismissed, a new concrete gigantomania started to take 
shape.22 But how did this come about exactly? How was it that Khrushchev’s 
“economy of construction” and the motto “faster, better, cheaper” came to 
take precedence from Germany and the Balkans all the way to Siberia? While 
unquestionably important, Khrushchev’s personality cannot explain how a 
single speech could have such a far-reaching impact on the built environment 
across the socialist world. Distinct mechanisms comprising the socialist world 
system enabled exchanges of ideas and techniques, but there was also a more 
broadly international dimension to this turn. 
At the American National Exhibition in Moscow in the summer of 1959, 
Soviet visitors witnessed not the might of the American military machine but 
the intoxicating power of consumer goods, modern household appliances, 
and brightly appointed model homes.23 When Nixon took Khrushchev on 
a tour around the exhibition, the two gravitated towards the Splitnik, an 
American prefabricated suburban model home, where the U.S. vice-president 
famously invited the Soviet premier to take a look around the kitchen. 
Pictures of the two leaders gesturing toward a yellow General Electric washer-
dryer made the rounds across the world, but as Greg Castillo argues in Cold 
War on the Home Front, the famous Kitchen Debate was the culmination, 
rather than the starting point, of a long-standing competition in material 
culture. Castillo systematically traces the “psychological warfare” designed 
and executed by U.S.-based information agencies, cultural institutions, and 
ambitious impresarios. By focusing on household exhibitions mounted in 
West Germany, as well as Soviet responses and mirroring e#orts to design 
a socialist material culture in the Eastern bloc, Castillo adds considerable 
evidence to the now more widely accepted claim that the Cold War was not 
fought merely in military terms but also, crucially, in the realm of design, 
consumerism, and domesticity. "e American home, he asserts, with its 
dazzling electric appliances and consumer comforts, turned into a veritable 
Cold War weapon. American propaganda campaigns throughout the 
1950s “encouraged the Soviet bloc to measure its progress through direct 
22 On Soviet “gigantomania” as a product of “the fascination and commitment to a technology 
of display,” as well as the propensity of socialist systems for “an exaggerated interest in mass 
production owing both to egalitarian ideological precepts and resource scarcities,” see Paul 
Josephson, “ ‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin 
to Gorbachev,” Technology and Culture 36, 3 (1995): 519–59.
23 On the impact of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, see Susan E. Reid, “Who 
Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 
1959,” Kritika 9, 4 (2008): 855–904; and Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s 
Advance through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 453–57. 
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comparisons with Western per-capita private consumption, the Achilles heel 
of economies based on state-owned heavy industries” (xi).
"rough the mechanisms of the Marshall Plan, U.S. authorities waged a 
propaganda war by promoting mass consumption and visions of abundance. 
While this e#ort initially lacked any aesthetic prescriptions, Castillo exposes 
the curious institutional links that ultimately led to the embrace of the 
International Style by U.S. campaigns in West Germany. (Chief among these 
institutions was the Museum of Modern Art in New York.) "is curious 
convergence was exempli!ed by the 1952 exhibition “We’re Building a Better 
Life,” prepared by the Mutual Security Agency, a successor to the Marshall 
Plan. It included a model home that visitors could walk through as well as an 
“inhabited” life-size apartment unit complete with a narrator perched above, 
who described the wonders of modern household technology. "e U.S. 
campaign, Castillo observes, hinged on the idea of cultivating “a transnational 
middle class” as well as on the promotion of Atlanticism, the “economic 
and military alignment that required West German rearmament” (69–70). 
Needless to say, though not directly targeting East Germans, the exhibition 
had a dizzying e#ect on workers living in a workers’ state but lacking similar 
material comforts. And even though not all West Germans were persuaded by 
the ideas of domesticity inherent to the American consumption formula, the 
images nevertheless proved highly seductive.
"is battle was not limited to the realm of choreographed exhibitions and 
idealized homes. Castillo also investigates the tangled history of pedagogical 
institutes like Ulm’s Hochschule für Gestaltung (HfG), a kind of postwar 
Bauhaus !nanced by the State Department that eventually came to embody 
“soft-power renegotiation” (42). Inaugurated in 1953 and championed, 
among others, by Bauhaus alumnus Max Bill, the HfG came to infuse prewar 
functionalism with postwar consumerism. "ere were similar e#orts in 
East Germany: Mart Stam, another former Bauhaus instructor, attempted 
in the late 1940s to recast Bauhaus pedagogy and cultivate a proletarian 
intelligentsia by emphasizing industrial design.24 But where West German 
experiments $ourished, e#orts to build a laboratory for creating an industrial 
socialist material culture in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) ended 
in failure. In the early 1950s, East German authorities launched an aggressive 
campaign against modernism (46–49). "is new course was marked by 
the establishment of the Deutsche Bauakademie, modeled after the Soviet 
24 On the contradictory fortunes of the Bauhaus legacy in East Germany, see also Eli Rubin, 
“"e Form of Socialism without Ornament: Consumption, Ideology, and the Fall and Rise 
of Modernist Design in the German Democratic Republic,” Journal of Design History 19, 2 
(2006): 155–68.
THE SOCIALIST DESIGN 647
Academy of Architecture and headed by Kurt Liebknecht (nephew of the 
martyred Spartacus founder Karl Liebknecht). Since the Bauakademie was 
interlinked with the SED Central Committee, design became enforced 
through the party machinery (50–51). "e Stalinallee, East Germany’s grand 
socialist urban showpiece and predecessor to the Novyi Arbat, “evoked a wider 
world spreading outward from the boulevard in a single direction—east” (90).
Conscious of the limits of focusing much of his book on utopian 
exhibitions and model homes displayed at trade fairs, Castillo is careful to 
point out that “both sides” presented selective visions of domesticity and 
technology. "e average American home on display at Sokol´niki Park in 
1959, he notes, was improbable (154). But precisely as exaggerations, these 
urban displays are highly suggestive. “At the !rst opportunity,” one Soviet 
visitor to the U.S. exhibition observed, “I would buy such a house.” Still, 
one could desire the displayed modern home and profess a belief in the 
superiority of socialism. As another visitor reportedly stated, “If the exhibition 
represents the American way of life, then it is the American way of life that 
we should overtake” (158). Others still, Castillo tells us, were dumbfounded 
by the presence of multiple rooms in a single apartment.25 But why did the 
Soviets allow these unabashed displays of American consumerism in the !rst 
place? Castillo points to expectations and promises that the Soviets created 
themselves, especially the massive turn toward industrial building methods in 
the 1950s, galvanized by the party promise in 1957 that every Soviet family 
would receive its own apartment.
When it came to industrial building methods, Soviet planners had long 
looked toward the United States.26 But Castillo shows how U.S. propagandists 
shipped prefab suburban homes to the Soviet Union to showcase both an 
American Way of Life and the breakdown of rigid class structures in the 
United States, where, as one advertisement put it, “everybody became a 
capitalist” (125). Another tactic was to “convert” Soviet functionaries by 
inviting them on tours of the construction industry in the United States. 
During one such visit by Soviet housing specialists in 1955, one of the 
American hosts observed that at the construction site “the Reds swarmed 
over the slab, dodging partitions and roo!ng sections as they came o# the 
truck, reaching up to gauge the ceiling heights (which they considered low), 
25 For a discussion of the comment books of the 1959 U.S. exhibition, see Aleksei Fominykh, 
“ ‘Kartinki s vystavki’: Knigi otzyvov Amerikanskoi vystavki v Moskve 1959 goda— 
vozvrashchenie istochnika,” Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2010): 151–70. Excerpts were published as 
“Amerikanskaia natsional´naia vystavka v Moskve, 1959 god: Kniga otzyvov,” Ab Imperio, no. 
2 (2010): 187–216.
26 Richard Anderson, “USA/USSR: Architecture and War,” Grey Room, no. 34 (Winter 2009): 
80–103.
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examining heating, plumbing, and wire connections” (131). Reports indicate 
that the Soviets were eager to buy U.S. prefab homes “complete with heating 
and air conditioning equipment, GE electric kitchen, and all display model 
furnishings.” "e Soviet minister of construction, similarly, was “ravished by 
an American suburban home” (134). "ough he does not employ Russian 
sources, Castillo intelligently combs through U.S. correspondence to argue 
that Soviet planning authorities were intensely driven by the desire to replicate 
U.S. technology advances, which begins to explain why U.S. exhibitions were 
allowed in the Soviet Union in the !rst place.
"e move toward the promised single-family apartment also signaled 
a new development: Soviet mass consumption. “Moving to a newly built 
separate apartment and creating a new domestic life,” Steven Harris has 
observed, “were the mass phenomena through which most Soviet citizens 
experienced the ‘thaw.’ ” In less than two decades, some 38 million Soviet 
families made that move.27 But if centrally planned economies were adept 
at churning out basic mass-produced apartments, they lagged far behind 
in crafting an interior material culture and the technology of everyday life 
(what East Germans referred to as Umweltgestaltung.) Crucial to this e#ort, 
Castillo observes, was the attempt to de!ne an “alternate model of consumer 
citizenship” (166). Yet these attempts merely “a%rmed the instability of East 
bloc socialism as a historical formation” (174). Castillo concludes: “What 
was shared in Western and Eastern Europe was not lifestyle but lifestyle 
aspirations” (177). Soviet planning may have su#ered from a plethora of 
structural problems, but envy was as crucial as any other. Some authors have 
pointed to the expansion of single-family apartments as a kind of retreat of 
the Soviet state from the private sphere.28 If anything, however, it seems to 
have highlighted con$ict and brought even more sharply into focus the all-
consuming presence of the state, given pervasive consumer shortages. As in 
the prewar period, space continued to be counted, tabulated, and rationed, 
including vertical space. As experts and neighborhood activists waged a battle 
27 Soviet mass housing, writes Steven Harris, “was a quintessentially Soviet campaign: a 
systemic solution to a systemic problem” (“ ‘I Know All the Secrets of My Neighbors’: "e 
Quest for Privacy in the Era of the Separate Apartment,” in Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres 
of Soviet Russia, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006], 171–90, 
quotations on 171 and 185).
28 Mark B. Smith, “Khrushchev’s Promise to Eliminate the Urban Housing Shortage: Rights, 
Rationality, and the Communist Future,” in Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, 
ed. Melanie Ilić and Jeremy Smith (New York: Routledge, 2009), 26–45; Smith, Property of 
Communists: !e Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2010).
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for the Soviet past in Moscow, other battles with the capitalist West took 
place inside city exhibition halls, kitchens, and living rooms.29 
Castillo’s greatest contribution is to direct us toward the making of 
aspirations, the ways in which those aspirations were shaped by a dynamic 
interaction, without which any understanding of technology during the 
Cold War would be inherently limited. "e Eastern bloc, he notes, often 
served as a “cultural conveyer belt” to introduce Western innovations for 
testing in Moscow (189). "is had important repercussions in the Soviet 
Union, but it also became evident in the East German campaign to “catch 
and overtake” the other Germany, an e#ort that raised both consumer 
expectations and the awareness of the centrally planned economy’s 
shortcomings (191). "e relational aspect of international consumption had 
unexpected and frustrating consequences for socialist states. “Torn between 
promises of plenty and rationalizations for scarcity,” Castillo writes, “the 
project to cultivate an enlightened socialist consumer instead became a 
!nishing school for citizen alienation” (204). 
To be sure, the industrial building systems championed by socialist states 
have a long, varied, and truly transnational history. Inherent to this modern 
preoccupation was the obsession with the automobile and the prospect of 
factory-made houses in an era of Taylorized mass production of consumer 
goods.30 When it came to housing, this obsession gave rise, in the words of 
Hans Scharoun, to “a genuine transformation of a kind that humanity rarely 
encounters.”31 If there is a dimension of the history of the built environment 
that truly captures the social convulsions, revolutionary imaginations, and 
the transnational $ow of ideas and techniques in the 20th century, this is the 
29 Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer 
Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61, 2 (2002): 212–52; Victor 
Buchli, “Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against Petit-bourgeois Consciousness in the 
Soviet Home,” in !e Material Culture Reader, ed. Victor Buchli (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 215–
36; Mart Kalm and Ingrid Ruudi, eds., Constructed Happiness: !e Domestic Environment in the 
Cold War Era (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Arts, 2005); Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, 
eds., Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2009).
30 Barry Bergdoll pertinently distinguishes between early practices of prefabricating building 
parts o#site, which were common, with what he calls an “architectural culture of prefabrication,” 
illustrated not merely by mass industrial building and onsite assembly but also by the marriage 
of architecture and industry and “marked as much by the creation of an image of modern 
living as by the exploration of new materials and techniques.” See his “Home Delivery: 
Viscidities of a Modernist Dream from Taylorized Serial Production to Digital Customizaton,” 
in Home Delivery: Fabricating the Modern Dwelling, ed. Bergdoll, Peter Christensen, and Ron 
Broadhurst (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2008), 12–26, quotation on 12. 
31 Hans Scharoun, quoted in Otto Haesler, Mein Lebensweg als Architekt (Berlin: 
Henschelverlag, 1957), xix. 
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story of industrial building systems. Attending these experiments, invariably, 
were pressing questions of variation and uniformity, the tension between 
architect and machine, market booms and busts, as well as issues related to 
site conditions, climates, and social context. "e other crucial factor in the 
expansion of industrial methods was war.32 As Jean-Louis Cohen reminds us, 
World War II extended military concrete building techniques into postwar civil 
construction programs (in France as in the Eastern bloc).33 A history of these 
systems would encompass, among other examples, the 19th-century treatises 
of the French inventor and industrialist François Coignet; experiments picked 
up in Britain by Joseph Tall and in the United States by "omas Edison; the 
highly in$uential designs of European architects at the 1927 Weissenhof 
exhibition in Stuttgart (Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, Le Corbusier) 
but also Martin Wagner and Ernst May; Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s and 
Philip Johnson’s 1932 !e International Style; the entire history of the Congrès 
Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM); the French innovator Jean 
Prouvé and the architect and planner Marcel Lods; R. Buckminster Fuller and 
Richard Neutra in the United States (via Vienna); the prefabricated Lustron 
houses in the 1940s United States; the large-panel system of the French 
company Raymond Camus (exported to the Soviet bloc); and the Danish 
Larsen-Nielsen system, applied en masse in European public housing projects 
in the 1960s.34 
32 In Germany, for example, prefabrication expanded in the aftermath of World War I. See 
Kurt Junghanns, Das Haus für alle: Zur Geschichte der Vorfertigung in Deutschland (Berlin: 
Ernst & Sohn, 1994). 
33 Jean-Louis Cohen, “Modern Architecture and the Saga of Concrete,” in Liquid Stone: 
New Architecture in Concrete, ed. Cohen and G. Martin Moeller, Jr. (New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2006), 30.
34 On Weissenhof, an initiative of the German Werkbund, see Richard Pommer and Christian 
F. Otto, Weissenhof 1927 and the Modern Movement in Architecture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). On the Modern Movement as a new aesthetic, see Henry-Russell 
Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, !e International Style (with a new foreword by Philip 
Johnson) (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). On CIAM, see Eric Mumford, !e CIAM 
Discourse on Urbanism, 1928–1960 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); and Jean-Louis 
Cohen, “International Rhetoric, Local Response,” in Back from Utopia: !e Challenge of the 
Modern Movement, ed. Hubert-Jan Henkel and Hilde Heynen (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 
2002), 84–85. On the possibilities of reconciliation between prefabrication and “human 
needs,” especially in the interwar period, see David Leatherbarrow and Mohsen Mostafavi, 
eds., Surface Architecture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 143–49. For a brief history of 
Western prefabricated dwellings, see Colin Davies, !e Prefabricated Home (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2005). On prefabrication in postwar Britain and the association of reinforced concrete 
with poverty, see Miles Glendinning and Stefan Muthesius, Tower Block: Modern Public 
Housing in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994); and Brian Finnimore, Houses from the Factory: System Building and the Welfare State, 
1942–74 (London: Rivers Oran Press, 1989).
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In Western Europe, architects intensely debated Typisierung at the 
beginning of the 20th century.35 As proli!c designers and innovators were 
dislocated by Hitler’s rise to power—some attempted to execute their ideas 
in the United States; others traveled to the Soviet Union—divergent paths 
emerged across borders and economies. Because these paths often mirrored 
one another, and since they necessarily originated in common aspirations of 
modernity, they may appear to be the same thing. At every turn, however, they 
were shaped by markets (or lack thereof ), government patrons, companies, 
business interests, and planning institutions.36 Bittner carefully traces the 
intense discussions among Soviet planners over tipovoe proektirovanie (serial 
reproduction of building prototypes) and tipizatsiia (standardization of 
distinct elements). Although the move from one to the other was neither 
consistent nor linear, a shift nevertheless took place under socialism from 
large-bloc building systems to the large-panel system (using prefabricated 
slabs, as opposed to bulky blocks, for load-bearing walls and even sections 
like staircases or balconies).37 Inevitably, socialist planners looked toward the 
West.38 Castillo’s account elucidates the international dimensions of this turn 
and the ways in which aspirations to “catch and overtake” the West led to the 
evolution of the ubiquitous housing prototypes in the GDR and what Blair 
Ruble has aptly called “hyper-standardization” across the socialist world.39 
But there were also important channels established within the Eastern bloc 
35 Experimenting with Baukasten im großen (large-scale building blocks) at the Bauhaus in 
the early 1920s, Gropius claimed that monotony “is not to be feared as long as the basic 
requirement is ful!lled to typify only building components whereas larger building structures 
remain variable” (Walter Gropius, “Wohnhaus-Industrie,” in Ein Versuchshaus des Bauhaus in 
Weimar, ed. Adolf Meyer [Munich: Albert Langen, 1924], 13).
36 For an overview of the various postwar fortunes of architects in Eastern Europe, see Anders 
Åman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era: An Aspect of Cold War 
History (New York: Architectural History Foundation; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
37 It was occasionally possible to work outside the limits of tipizatsiia if one was lucky (or well 
connected) enough to get “special commissions” such as showcase cultural centers, palaces 
of congresses, or other landmark projects. Personal villas and summer dachas for Central 
Committee cronies could similarly be built in “the Scandinavian style,” but editors kept them 
out of architectural journals and catalogues. See Frédéric Chaubin, CCCP: Cosmic Communist 
Constructions Photographed (Cologne: Taschen, 2011).
38 East German planners visited France in 1956 to observe industrial building systems, 
Auguste Perret’s Le Havre, and Le Corbusier’s Unité d’Habitation (which they proclaimed 
inadequate). See Werner Durth, Jörn Düwel, and Niels Gutschow, Architektur und Städtebau 
der DDR (Frankfurt: Campus, 1999), 1:481–82.
39 Blair A. Ruble, “From Khrushcheby to Korobki,” in Russian Housing in the Modern Age: 
Design and Social History, ed. William Craft Brum!eld and Ruble (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 232–70.
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whereby techniques and expertise circulated.40 It becomes useful, then, 
to think not so much in terms of a simple line from Gropius and Stuttgart to 
postwar socialist tipizatsiia but rather about interconnected ideas and angles 
of innovation executed in various contexts and at di#erent scales. "ese 
combinations produced outcomes of varying focus, detail, and impact.41
Consider, also, the obsession with the promise of new materials and the 
way this obsession has shaped modern cities. Much like modernist architects 
in the interwar period, socialist building industries celebrated the powers 
and promise of zhelezobeton (reinforced concrete).42 Across the Eastern bloc, 
construction industry experts exchanged technical details and formulas 
through coordinated e#orts. Yet here, too, it would be too simplistic to 
draw a straight line between modernist euphoria and postwar Soviet-style 
mass planning. After all, the history of this enduring material is far from 
straightforward. Rather, it has been characterized by leaps and bounds, 
waves of entrepreneurial investment and capitulation, periods of almost utter 
disillusionment and sudden !ts of enthusiasm and productivity.43 It was not 
so much that the obsession with concrete’s powers was narrowly ideological. 
Rather, over time, the material came to encompass the beliefs of a modern 
era. It was “ideally suited to modernism’s aspiration to structural ‘honesty’ ” 
insofar as it allowed designers to expose load-bearing functions that had been 
previously concealed.44 But just as the material made it possible to expose the 
inner structure of buildings and to execute architectural visions of a greater 
40 For an original account of how Czechoslovakia pioneered industrial building typologies, 
as well as the complexities of architectural practice under early socialism, see Kimberly Elman 
Zarecor, Manufacturing a Socialist Modernity: Housing in Czechoslovakia, 1945–60 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011).
41 Widespread e#orts to standardize architecture and building systems did not mean that 
standardization was total or even that standards were uniformly applied. Yugoslavia, for 
example, produced striking innovations (as did Cuba). On Yugoslavia, see Vladimir Kulić, 
“ ‘East? West? Or Both?’ Foreign Perceptions of Architecture in Socialist Yugoslavia,” Journal of 
Architecture 14, 1 (2009): 129–47. 
42 For a valuable overview, see Antoine Picon, “Architecture and Technology: Two Centuries 
of a Creative Tension,” in Liquid Stone, 8–19.
43 "e French engineer François Hennebique contributed to the rising popularity of concrete 
in turn-of-the-century Europe. Reinforced concrete, however, which involved the introduction 
of steel elements to carry the tensile stress in load-bearing structures, gained momentum only 
later. Standards for cement production and innovations in reinforced concrete were deeply tied 
to technological advances and competition between companies (as well as patent protections). 
See Kenneth Frampton, “Foreword,” in Peter Collins, Concrete: !e Vision of a New Architecture, 
2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), xv–xx; and Cyrille Simonnet, Le 
Béton: Histoire d’un matériau (Marseille: Éditions Parenthèses, 2005). 
44 Cohen and Moeller, Jr., “Introduction,” in Liquid Stone, 6.
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scale, so it also permanently !xed in space contemporary technological 
de!ciencies (like poor material quality and imperfect !xtures). 
Beton. For millions, the word alone conjures up countless intimate details 
of drab everyday life in the Eastern bloc. Yet, for a long while, concrete also 
became associated with ideas of progress, social reform, and unprecedented 
possibilities. Its story conjures up visions of modernity, often in competition, 
and the ways in which “a seemingly innocuous and ingenious combination of 
inert substances” could be imbued with distinct meanings.45 It also provides an 
excellent case study to locate the East–West conjuncture. Under socialism, it 
was possible to embrace distinct features of this inherently modern obsession 
and couple them with designs for a noncapitalist modernity. Modern mass 
prefabrication under centrally planned economies, in turn, gave rise to 
problems that had not existed before. In the absence of markets, innovation 
lagged and plagiarism of technological models spiked. State monopoly over 
property and planning (despite varying degrees of decentralization in the 
construction industry) shaped avenues for research and design. Prefabricated 
“houses for delivery” in the United States were fundamentally tied to a series 
of companies competing for a supposedly emerging market, which ultimately 
did not materialize. In West European cities, prefabrication often became 
associated with disastrous social planning and troubled satellite towns. 
"ese examples were intimately tied to the opportunities and pressures of 
markets, patent rules, and entrepreneurial initiatives. Not so in planned 
economies. Unencumbered by markets or social backlash, socialist states 
executed industrial building methods on an unprecedented scale. Scale, in 
turn, introduced problems that were not merely quantitative in nature: onsite 
assembly; organization of labor; workforce training; site inspections; mass 
social and leisure provisions; massive environmental consequences.46 
"ese endless rows of prefab blocks shaped (and still do) the urban 
experience of tens of millions.47 By the early 1960s, the United Nations 
had recognized the Soviet Union as a world leader in building cheap 
mass housing, so it organized study tours in the Soviet republics for Latin 
45 Cohen, “Modern Architecture,” 20–33. 
46 On this point, see Paul Josephson, Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth? Technological Utopianism 
under Socialism, 1917–1989 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
47 “Nostalgia for socialism,” writes "omas Lahusen, “has become a commodity, but not for 
those who still live in its ruins, because they are home.” See his “Decay or Endurance? "e 
Ruins of Socialism,” Slavic Review 65, 4 (2006): 736–46, quotation on 736. A comparative 
e#ort to study the ubiquitous “grands ensembles” has produced a rich overview of the spread of 
large-scale building systems in postwar France and the Eastern bloc, but also in Algeria, South 
Korea, Iran, and South Africa: Frédéric Dufaux and Annie Fourcaut, eds., Le monde des grands 
ensembles (Paris: Créaphis, 2004). 
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American, African, Asian, and Middle Eastern planners.48 In the GDR, die 
Platte became a reference to life under socialism itself.49 Studying this vast 
material legacy of socialism raises a series of issues. First, the common art 
historical emphasis on identi!able networks of artistic patronage may become 
irrelevant, since many of these vast complexes were designed collectively or 
anonymously. Especially in the less developed socialist countries, planners 
often borrowed or copied foreign technical systems. "ese housing systems, 
moreover, came with a corresponding planning and distribution bureaucracy 
as well as a new vocabulary.50 While the exact processes and models varied 
somewhat from country to country, on the whole certain elemental features of 
socialist material reality became su%ciently similar across the Eastern bloc to 
allow for essentially shared references to emerge. "ey are still visible today in 
the expanding industry of resurrecting socialist material culture in Germany 
and elsewhere.51 To a certain extent, these features of central planning 
mirrored the decline of the heroic architect in the West as well as the rise of 
objects of everyday life, which in the postwar period “involved more radical 
transformations of space than the most extreme architectural proposals.”52 
But the socialist construction industry also provides a valuable case study of 
the way in which di#use power operates: by making seemingly abstract terms 
(“housing need,” “cost reduction,” “simple design”) operational, by blurring 
authorial claims, and by shifting accountability for built outcomes.
Cold War divisions also produced unexpected entanglements. One 
example is Oscar Niemeyer, the distinguished author of Brasilia’s urban 
plan, who maintained close ties to the GDR and was a popular !xture in 
48 “Report of the Study Tour of Building Technologists from Latin America, Africa, Asia, 
and the Middle East to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (New York: United Nations, 
1964).
49 Christine Hannemann, Die Platte: Industrialisierter Wohnungsbau in der DDR, 3rd ed. 
(Berlin: Schiler, 2005). One in !ve residents in the GDR lived in large-scale housing complexes 
(Großsiedlung). A large proportion of all industrially built housing units were of a single model: 
the ubiquitous Wohnungsbauserie 70 (WBS-70).
50 Planners invented technical descriptions to name features that had not existed before 
(WBS-70), whereas Eastern bloc residents coined new terms to express similar frustrations 
at scarce space and mock the authorities (khrushcheby) or ridiculed planning concepts like 
“complex urbanism.” "ere was incidental isomorphism even when Eastern bloc large-scale 
planning failed to achieve its stated goal of establishing a universal socialist standard.
51 See Paul Betts, “"e Twilight of the Idols: East German Memory and Material Culture,” 
Journal of Modern History 72, 3 (2000): 731–65.
52 Beatriz Colomina, “Cold War/Hothouses,” in Cold War Hothouses: Inventing Postwar 
Culture from Cockpit to Playboy, ed. Colomina, AnnMarie Brennan, and Jeannie Kim (New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004), 10–21, quotation on 11.
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the socialist architectural press.53 Indeed, modern Brazilian architecture was 
exhibited and discussed widely in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s.54 
Still, exchanges and international connections of this kind could have the 
e#ect of actually reinforcing East–West divisions. "at socialist planning 
was not isolated from broader international developments does not mean 
that it was indistinguishable from them. Socialism was more than the sum 
of standardization in technology and ideological and aesthetic formulas. "e 
coupling of widely available technology with speci!c planning visions and 
organizational systems (as well as inherent systemic shortages) created a kind 
of familiar amalgam on a grand scale. "at is why it was possible to have 
an international socialist “market” for standard building systems without an 
actual market. Planning bureaucracies enabled an unprecedented exchange in 
technology and expertise across the Eastern bloc. Belief in building socialism 
was not relevant merely because it provided a clear blueprint for aesthetic 
or technical choices (most often it did not), but because it framed ambition 
53 On Niemeyer and the GDR, see Elmar Kossel, “Oscar Niemeyer und Deutschland: Die 
Rezeption in der DDR,” Oscar Niemeyer: Eine Legende der Moderne / A Legend of Modernism, 
ed. Paul Andreas and Ingeborg Flagge (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsches Architektur Museum; 
Basel: Birkhäuser, 2003), 59–68. In 1963, Niemeyer received the Lenin Prize. See O. Ianitskii 
and V. Khait, “Oscar Niemeyer,” Arkhitektura SSSR, no. 7 (1963): 9–13.
54 “Arquitetura brasileira na Europa,” Módulo, no. 32 (March 1963): 60–61. 
Everyday Socialism on Display: Storefront replica of a socialist-era interior 
advertising Ostel, a GDR-themed hostel, Berlin, Germany 
Source: Author’s photograph, 2009.
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and established the parameters of the possible. Assessing the international 
dimensions of the socialist planning experiment, therefore, should not be an 
end in itself. Rather, an appreciation for the porosity of cultural and technical 
frontiers, the ambiguity inherent in dealings with one’s past, international 
aspirations, and the back-and-forth of speci!c practices and ideas ought to 
bring more into the focus the speci!c ways that socialist states could be both 
“monolithic and brittle.”55 Rather than staying con!ned to familiar questions 
about the limits of Soviet power, this approach would raise new questions, for 
example, about the role of comparison in historical development, the process 
of mimicking, and everyday practices inherent to an imperfect socialist 
material life. 
When reading Bittner and Castillo together, it becomes clear that 
anxieties over the Stalinist past and the postwar consumerist boom in the 
West converged in the minds of socialist apparatchiks. As Konrád’s city 
builder would have it, the socialist system was both programmed in a speci!c 
way and programmed those who lived within it, including their desires. 
"e "aw seemed to heighten awareness of this programming by displaying 
parts of the inner architecture of the socialist planning machinery (just as 
reinforced concrete exposed both the ambitions and inherent limitations of 
the socialist urban program). !at was the “socialist design”—not a speci!c 
aesthetic formula or a consistent de!nition but rather an institutionalized 
logic, a series of practices and models that were often invented, routinely 
borrowed from the West, executed on a massive scale, then submitted to the 
grueling test of standing up to Western achievements.
Empire
An imposing silhouette frames the entrance to the Novyi Arbat thoroughfare in 
Moscow: a concrete and steel high-rise building resembling an open book. As 
the headquarters of the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 
or CMEA), founded in 1949 to oversee economic relations among socialist 
countries, this iconic structure came to symbolize Soviet e#orts to integrate 
the socialist world. One can trace that familiar silhouette on letterhead stored 
in archives from Hanoi to Havana, on medals and “friendship $ags,” on 
$ashy posters and commemorative stamps, and on innumerable other objects 
that circulated across continents.56 While shaped by the domestic policies of 
55 Stephen Kotkin (with a contribution by Jan T. Gross), Uncivil Society: 1989 and the 
Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009), 18.
56 A 2009 Moscow exhibition commemorated the material culture of the Comecon, including 
displays of archival documents, Eastern bloc consumer artifacts, and fashion catalogues: 
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Stalinism and the "aw, then, parts of Arbat’s urban pro!le also stood as an 
unmistakable reference to a sprawling socialist world-system.57
Postwar international crosscurrents and socialist exchange were not 
the same thing, though they were connected in important ways. Whether 
formally or informally, postwar architectural exchange remained a distinctly 
transnational a#air. "e novelty, as Stephen Kotkin has shown in an in$uential 
essay published in this journal, was the creation of a new socialist arena, 
stretching from the eastern regions of Europe to East Asia.58 In certain locales 
of this vast territory prewar contacts survived and reemerged in the 1950s, 
while elsewhere war displaced countless people, erased preexisting institutions, 
and created new alignments. In East Germany, as Castillo demonstrates, 
prewar and postwar spheres overlapped and often clashed. But in countries 
“SEV: Sovetskii proekt ekonomicheskoi integratsii,” 29 April–28 June 2009, Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), Moscow.
57 For an analysis of Moscow’s urban imperial manifestations, see Monica Rüthers, “Moskau als 
imperiale Stadt: Sowjetische Haupstadtarchitektur als Medium imperialer Selbstbeschreibung 
in vergleichender Perspektive,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 56, 4 (2008): 481–506.
58 Stephen Kotkin, “Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance across the Post-
Mongol Space,” Kritika 8, 3 (2007): 487–531.
Concrete Symbol: "e Comecon building in Moscow’s Arbat 
Source: Arkhitektura SSSR, no. 4 (1966).
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that were never integrated in the modernism of the interwar period (such 
as, say, Albania), the socialist arena proved crucial for the construction of 
professional and urban identities. "e international dimension was always 
present, therefore, but the !ercest professional struggles were often fought at 
the Eastern bloc level.
Taking seriously the global pretensions of socialist states, György Péteri 
has argued that “the communist project in Eastern Europe has been the 
largest deliberately designed experiment in globalization in modern history.”59 
Nurturing international ambitions, Soviet and Eastern bloc elites were conscious 
of the superiority of their social mission, or what Péteri aptly calls “systemic 
relativism,” meaning the essentially di#erent and incommensurate nature of 
state socialism with Western capitalism. But they also became painfully aware 
of their poor economic and technological performance in relation to the West, 
not merely in terms of growth rates and tons of coal or steel produced, but 
essentially in terms of “the failure of state socialism to appropriate and adopt 
the main tendencies of international technological development and their 
failure to pioneer such changes.”60 Superiority and inferiority, then, combined 
“to form the mentality of the communist elite and their seemingly capricious 
oscillations between the extremes of o#ensive or defensive, integrationist or 
isolationist policies.”61 
Exchange was at the heart of this large-scale experiment in socialist 
globalization. As both Bittner and Castillo suggest, technical inventions that 
were not originally Soviet could be e#ectively appropriated and circulated 
by a variety of Soviet and Eastern bloc agents and institutions. "e Soviets 
were directly in control of many facets of this exchange, but much of it 
was also overseen by Eastern bloc authorities themselves.62 Momentous as 
it was, however, socialist exchange did not necessarily bring more Eastern 
bloc cohesion, strengthen political loyalty, or even, in certain cases, increase 
59 György Péteri, “Nylon Curtain—Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the 
Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe,” Slavonica 10, 2 (2004): 113–
23, quotation on 117.
60 “Out of !fty major technological advances that were made during the post-war era and still 
shape our lives today,” Péteri observes, “only three appeared !rst in a socialist country” (ibid., 
118).
61 Ibid.
62 Ideas, technological formulas, and blueprints circulated across the Eastern bloc through 
the formal mechanisms of “technical–scienti!c exchange,” administered by bureaucrats and 
sanctioned in the central plan. See, for example, “Technisch-wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, 
das ist Freundschaft,” November 1950, Bundesarchiv (Archive of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Berlin, BArch) DE1/10676.
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openness.63 In rediscovering this $ow of ideas, peoples, and technology across 
Cold War borders, it becomes necessary to spell out the conditions and 
institutions that contributed to certain outcomes and not others. Nuanced 
analyses of socialist exchange would also help us explain how the Eastern bloc 
could seem both resilient and unstable.
One example that clearly manifested the contradictory nature of socialist 
exchange was the !fth congress of the Union internationale des architectes 
(the International Union of Architects, UIA), held in Moscow in 1958. 
Founded in 1948 in Lausanne, Switzerland, the UIA attempted to unite all 
international architectural organizations into one body—a kind of United 
Nations of architects.64 Like CIAM, the UIA was rooted in preexisting 
professional networks and international contacts: the British planner Sir 
Patrick Abercrombie; the Swiss Jean Tschumi; the Hungarian-born expatriate 
Ernö Gold!nger; the American Ralph Walker; the Russian Nicolas Baranov; 
and the illustrious, if formal, presence of Auguste Perret.65 "e organization 
found its energetic spokesman in Pierre Vago, an enterprising architect born 
in Budapest to József Vágó (associated with the League of Nations building 
in Geneva) and who became a founding editor of the in$uential journal 
L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui.66 After CIAM rejected an invitation to join 
ranks, the UIA developed as a bureaucratic structure encompassing national 
professional associations with sections devoted to Western and Eastern 
Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa. As Vago would later put it, the goal 
was to form an organization that was neither “elitist” nor “dogmatic like 
CIAM.”67
Even though Vago and his associates were committed to taking politics 
out of international architectural gatherings, Cold War tensions nevertheless 
seeped in.68 Preparations for the 1958 Moscow congress, for example, were 
63 Architects’ memoirs still provide the best insights on the contradictory nature of socialist 
exchange. See Maks Velo, Paralel me arkitekturën (Tiranë: njeriu, 1998); Petraq Kolevica, 
Arkitektura dhe diktatura, 2nd ed. (Tiranë: Logoreci, 2004); and Ion Mircea Enescu, Arhitect 
sub communism (Bucharest: Paideia, 2007).
64 Aymone Nicolas, L’apogée des concours internationaux d’architecture: L’action de l’UIA, 
1948–1975 (Paris: Picard, 2007), 39–43.
65 Among the major contributions of CIAM, which was founded in La Sarraz, Switzerland, 
in 1928, was the in$uential Athens Charter, a modernist manifesto on urban design adopted 
in 1933. "e charter outlined the principal organizational features of the “functional city”: 
dwelling, work, leisure, and circulation. See Mumford, !e CIAM Discourse on Urbanism.
66 Pierre Vago, “De l’origine à la foundation: Les structures et leur évolution,” in L’UIA, 
1948–1998 (Paris: Éditions de l’Épure, 1998), 17–27.
67 Ibid., 23.
68 One prominent example, involving the Field brothers, Stalinist show trials, and the UIA, is 
captured in Hermann Field and Kate Field, Trapped in the Cold War: !e Ordeal of an American 
Family (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
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jeopardized by the Soviet and Eastern bloc invasion of Budapest in November 
1956. "e Egyptian section also !led a complaint letter with the UIA in 
December, denouncing the British and French attacks against Port Said.69 
Vago immediately $ew to Moscow to get assurances from Soviet authorities 
that the congress would be free of politics.70 "e Soviets were willing to oblige, 
deeming the congress a valuable opportunity to showcase postwar Soviet 
planning achievements. Accordingly, Soviet authorities mobilized planning 
bureaucrats and issued invitations around the world.71 By special permission 
from the CPSU, the congress was held within the Kremlin from 21 to 27 July, 
and guests were treated to waltzes played by a Red Army orchestra, tours of 
the Lenin mausoleum, and a visit to a prefab panel factory.72 All in all, some 
1,400 delegates came to Moscow, representing more than 40 countries.73 In 
addition to large Soviet, Eastern bloc, and French contingents, Latin America 
was also heavily represented, with Colombia and Mexico sending 81 and 148 
delegates, respectively.74
"e chosen theme of the congress (“Construction and Reconstruction 
of Towns, 1945–57”) resonated both with postwar socialist planners as 
well as delegations from the “developing world.”75 Even though discussants 
reiterated familiar arguments about the aesthetic and functional aspects of 
urban planning, one particular concern emerged across Cold War lines: 
monotony. Architects around the globe, the meeting’s resolution proclaimed, 
were enthusiastically embracing industrial building methods and more 
rational planning techniques. Yet these same techniques could easily result 
in uniform urban pro!les. "e resolution did not explicitly argue against 
monumentality in urban planning, an issue that had preoccupied CIAM 
for decades, but merely pointed out that “the goal in designing housing 
and public centers should be the creation of possibilities for decent human 
69 Nicolas, L’apogée, 111–12.
70 Pierre Vago, Une vie intense (Brussels: Archive d’Architecture Moderne), 444–46. Similar 
tensions erupted when the UIA decided to hold its seventh congress in Havana in 1963. 
Reportedly, Field Castro and Che Guevera joined an animated discussion on architecture and 
revolution (John Michael Austin-Smith, “Havana, 1963,” in L’UIA, 1948–1998, 113–18).
71 VOKS letter to Albanian–Soviet Friendship Society, 12 February 1958, Gosudarstvennyi 
arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. 9576, op. 4, d. 1, l. 42; invitation to the UIA Congress, 
Arkivi i Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign A#airs, Tirana, 
Albania, AMPJ), viti 1958, dosja 64, $eta 10. 
72 Luben Tonev, “Moscou, 1958,” in L’UIA, 1948–1998, 101.
73 Ibid., 98.
74 “Compte rendu du congrès par A. G. Heaume,” L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui 29, 79 
(September 1958): 7.
75 International Union of Architects, Construction et reconstruction des villes, 1945–1957/ 
Stroitel´stvo i rekonstruktsiia gorodov, 1945–1957, 2 vols. (Moscow: Édition d’État de 
Documentation sur la Construction et l’Architecture, 1958). 
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living.”76 It concluded with a general call to “cooperation” among countries 
and a reference to peace. But what exactly was “decent human living”? And 
how could monotony be avoided? "e resolution similarly avoided questions 
of property and economic planning, and it did not explicitly outline the 
characteristics of the “new aesthetics” of industrially built cities. Underlying 
a seemingly universal agreement on industrial building methods, then, were 
unresolved questions and fundamental divergences. In their !nal report, for 
example, the East German delegates wrote that there could be no industrial 
solution to urban problems in the West as long as there was private property 
and a market economy.77
A number of other ideological clashes betrayed the uno%cial symbol 
of the gathering—the ubiquitous white dove. At one point, some delegates 
brought forward a motion to adopt the Stockholm petition on nuclear 
disarmament (based on the 1950 Stockholm Peace Appeal originally 
formulated by Ilya Ehrenburg). "e congress initially adopted it, but before 
Soviet o%cials had any chance to run with the headline, UIA executives 
canceled the motion.78 On another occasion, Poland’s Helena Syrkus urged 
fellow architects to “break the silence” and reintroduce the human scale in 
architecture.79 More conspicuously, Jean Tschumi of Switzerland and Jean 
Fayeton of France took issue with Soviet architecture in their speeches.80 
Curiously, Soviet o%cials seemed willing to admit to past planning errors. On 
the question of monumentality in Moscow, for example, the architect Karo 
Alabian, author of the Central "eater of the Red Army and secretary of the 
Soviet Union of Architects, readily acknowledged the architectural excesses of 
the period between 1935 and 1956. Although some UIA o%cials’ accounts 
tend to smooth over these confrontations, notes kept by the East Germans 
indicate that delegates divided themselves along Cold War lines.81 Indeed, 
76 “Entschliessung des V. Kongresses der U.I.A,” 4 August 1958, BArch DH1/8077. See 
also “Resolutions du Ve Congrès de l’Union Internationale des Architectes,” L’Architecture 
d’aujourd’hui 29, 79 (September 1958): 13.
77 Kurt Liebknecht and Walter Pisternik, “Bericht über die Teilnahme am UIA-Kongress im 
Moskau,” 4 August 1958, BArch DH1/8077.
78 Vago, Une vie intense, 446.
79 Helena Syrkus (1900–82), along with her husband Szymon (1893–1967), were prominent 
Polish members of CIAM. Helena delivered an impassioned speech in defense of Socialist 
Realism at the organization’s congress in Bergamo, Italy, in 1949, in which she criticized 
CIAM for having made “a fetish of the skeleton,” called for bringing art closer to the people, 
and declared that there should be “a greater respect for the spirit of the past.” See Sigfried 
Giedion, Architecture, You and Me (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 79–90, 
quotation on 87.
80 Liebknecht and Pisternik, “Bericht,” BArch DH1/8077. 
81 Tonev, “Moscou”; Vago, Une vie intense.
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Soviet and Bulgarian representatives took the $oor “on behalf ” of the socialist 
countries while the Dutch, French, British, and West Germans spoke for “the 
West.”82 Speaking time was also allocated to China, as well as Chile (for Latin 
America) and the U.S. delegation (for North America).
Records of private meetings between Soviet and East German planners 
also bring to light the tensions that permeated Eastern bloc professional 
elites in the aftermath of the Soviet "aw.83 On 26 July, the East German 
delegation—which consisted of Walter Pisternik, Kurt Liebknecht, Edmund 
Collein, and Gerhard Kosel—met with Alabian and Ivan Aleksandrovich 
Grishmanov, head of the CPSU Central Committee’s Department of 
Construction.84 As outlined in reports !led by Liebknecht and Kosel, the 
East Germans were eager to raise a number of questions and concerns about 
the future of socialist architecture. "ey claimed, for example, that the 
Soviet response to the French delegates’ criticism had been lukewarm. Soviet 
design projects exhibited at the congress had struck Liebknecht as inspired 
by “fashionable Western architecture.” Yet another point of concern was 
a speech by the chief of the Institute of History and "eory at the Soviet 
Academy of Construction and Architecture, in which he had spoken about 
“an architecture for the 20th century” without even mentioning social classes. 
In laying out these concerns, the East Germans seemed to take on the role of 
spokesmen for the Eastern bloc. "ey appeared anxious, for example, about 
Western cultural in$uences in Hungary after 1956 and warned that there 
could be no coexistence between Western and socialist architecture.
While admitting that he had not properly responded to the French 
accusations, Alabian nevertheless pointed out that the Soviets themselves 
had acknowledged the architectural excesses of the Stalin era. Still, nobody 
could actually deny the obvious di#erences between socialist and capitalist 
urban planning, he noted. A simple comparison between Moscow and 
82 Miles Glendinning notes that the event also enabled the welfare-state architect Robert 
Matthew to act as a diplomatic “broker.” See his “Cold-War Conciliation: International 
Architectural Congresses in the Late 1950s and Early 1960s,” Journal of Architecture 14, 2 
(2009): 197–217. 
83 "e issue of separate representation for East and West German architects had long frustrated 
UIA executives. See a report by Kurt Liebknecht, “Selbständige Mitgliedschaft des Bundes 
Deutscher Architekten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in der UIA,” 2 August 1958, 
BArch DH1/8077. 
84 Walter Pisternik (1904–90) was a functionary of the Building A#airs Section of the SED 
Central Committee. Gerhard Kosel (1909–2003), the most vocal proponent of industrialized 
building in the GDR, served as state secretary and deputy minister of construction. As noted 
earlier, Kurt Liebknecht (1905–94) was the !rst president of the Deutsche Bauakademie and 
a member of the SED Central Committee. Edmund Collein (1906–92), a Bauhaus alumnus, 
served as vice-president of the Bauakademie.
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London would su%ce. "e socialist city, Alabian went on, would have 
to be built around a “social core,” not merely parks and trees encircling 
private businesses. As for the elements of the “architecture for the 20th 
century,” as well as how this related to “national forms,” he merely admitted 
that the issue was complicated. Certainly, the point was not to paste 
some “national” pastiche on façades. (As an example, Alabian brought up 
Armenian architects who had reportedly carved religious elements on the 
panels of modern housing blocks.) Simplicity, he insisted, could also serve 
as “a national form.” Although Alabian concurred that a tough stance on 
Western architecture was necessary, he also deemed the UIA of “colossal 
political importance,” especially given the tendency in South American 
architectural circles to challenge American planning models. In conclusion, 
participants agreed to call a meeting among socialist countries to clarify 
further the issues related to socialist architecture.85
"e day before Alabian and Grishmanov met with the East Germans, 
Khrushchev attended a meeting of the UIA executive board, where he criticized 
the strong in$uence of classical Greek and Roman architecture in the Soviet 
Union. Roman architects, he asserted, were geniuses who built palaces for the 
85 Kurt Liebknecht, “Bericht über zwei Besprechungen beim Leiter der Abteilung Bauwesen 
des ZK der UDSSR–Gen. Grischmanow,” 30 July 1958, BArch DH1/8077.
Khrushchev and the Architects: "e Soviet leader speaks to participants at 
the congress of the International Union of Architects, Moscow, July 1958 
Source: Arkhitektura SSSR, no. 8 (1958).
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wealthy. But social relations under socialism were of a wholly di#erent nature, 
and economic calculations were at the heart of central planning. Stalin-era 
Soviet architects, Khrushchev complained, had adorned even cowsheds with 
columns. Nevertheless, the Soviet leader drew a line between socialist planning 
and Western modernism. “We do not want to build cities !lled with boxes, 
as the French architect Le Corbusier recommends,” he said, “which is to say 
that we do not want to simplify things.”86 "e Soviet Union did not need 
30-story buildings or long silhouettes because people could not take shelter 
in silhouettes. "ere were a few things Soviet planners could learn from the 
West, he acknowledged, but when it came to housing, the West had produced 
little innovation since World War II. In conclusion, while admitting that there 
was no such thing as a rigid socialist form, Khrushchev argued that socialist 
architecture was created by the convergence of a certain calculus of cost and 
the overriding principle of serving the people.87
"ese seemingly minor incidents and exchanges in Moscow in 1958 
encapsulated many of the overlapping dilemmas of the Soviet "aw. Above 
all, they exposed generational and personal con$icts within the planning 
profession (similar to the generational battles that Bittner identi!es at the 
Gnesin Institute or among Moscow planners). Whereas Liebknecht was 
personally invested in the previous denunciation of “formalism,” Gerhard 
Kosel was !rmly committed to the prospects of industrialized construction 
and prefabrication technology.88 If Liebknecht stood for socialist realism, Kosel 
emerged as the chief architect of Eastern bloc-wide exchange in industrial 
building methods.89 Later that year, he was handpicked to lead the Comecon’s 
Berlin-based permanent commission on construction, whose task was to 
oversee the exchange of construction technology and architectural standards 
among member states.90 Personal ambition, in short, was deeply interwoven 
with evolving debates at the national, Eastern bloc, and international levels.91
In addition to highlighting the international horizon in which postwar 
architectural discussions were carried out, these exchanges reveal the self-
86 Ibid. See also Gerhard Kosel, “Aktennotiz über eine Besprechung in der Abt. Bauwesen des 
Zentralkomitees der KPdSU am 26.7.58,” 28 July 1958, BArch DH1/8077.
87 Liebknecht, “Bericht,” BArch DH1/8077.
88 Hannemann, Die Platte, 75–83.
89 Gerhard Kosel, “Tendenzen der Industrialisierung des Wohnungsbaues in der Sowjetunion,” 
28 July 1958, BArch DH1/8077.
90 “Bericht über die konstituierende Tagung der Ständigen Kommission Bauwesen des Rates 
für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe,” 17 October 1958, BArch DH1/8084.
91 Kosel even established contacts with the Palo Alto-based American architect Ernest J. 
Kump, who promised to forward materials on U.S. modular housing systems (Gerhard Kosel, 
“Betr. Amerikanisches Modulsystem,” 28 July 1958, BArch DH1/8077).
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induced anxiety pervading the socialist world system. "at anxiety was 
rooted not merely in the abandonment of one style for another but in the 
understanding that socialist planning was part of a much larger dynamic 
of power and control, as argued convincingly by both Bittner and Castillo. 
"e 1958 Moscow episodes also point to the fact that the appropriation of 
Soviet practices in the cultural realm was often more subtle than direct orders, 
and that avenues of in$uence were equally shaped by Eastern bloc actors, 
local interests, and daily power struggles. Finally, the exchanges between the 
Soviets and the East Germans in Moscow openly acknowledged the daunting 
competition in architecture, urban planning, and material culture with the 
capitalist West. Even if such a thing as “socialist design” could not be readily 
de!ned, as Khrushchev acknowledged in front of his guests at the Kremlin, it 
had to be invented merely for the purpose of distinguishing it from Western 
architectural and urban forms. East German architects heavily criticized 
international “star architects” yet they could barely conceal their obsession 
with Western architecture.92 Geographical proximity to the West certainly 
shaped this outlook, but the East German anxieties were also shared across 
the Eastern bloc. Architects and planners embodied the paradox of “socialist 
design”: their blueprints “cut through the face of doubt,” as Konrád’s unnamed 
city builder boasted, yet self-induced doubt came back to haunt them, just as 
it kept haunting him, again and again.93 
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92 "e East German delegation, for example, passionately denounced the Interbau, a 
development project for the Hansaviertel in West Berlin, featuring the designs of Le Corbusier 
and Walter Gropius. On Interbau’s impact on East German planners, see Castillo, Cold War 
on the Home Front, 182–88.
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